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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Following a court trial, the district court found Richard Paul Meyers guilty of felony
grand theft. In the weeks before the court trial, Mr. Meyers sent a letter to the district court
stating he wanted to proceed pro se. However, the district court did not address Mr. Meyers’
request to proceed pro se.

Mr. Meyers appealed, asserting the district court violated his

constitutional right to self-representation when it ignored his request to proceed pro se.
In its Respondent’s Brief, the State argues that Mr. Meyers did not show the district court
violated his right to self-representation, because his statement of intent to exercise his right to
self-representation was not framed as a clear and unequivocal request, and, to the extent his
statement constituted a request, he subsequently abandoned it. (See Resp. Br., pp.5-10.)
This Reply Brief is necessary to demonstrate that, contrary to the State’s contention,
Mr. Meyers submitted a clear and unequivocal request to proceed pro se. Additionally, the
totality of the circumstances suggests Mr. Meyers did not abandon his request to proceed pro se.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated in
Mr. Meyers’ Appellant’s Brief.

They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but are

incorporated herein by reference thereto.

1

ISSUE
Did the district court violate Mr. Meyers’ constitutional right to self-representation, when it
ignored his request to proceed pro se?
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Violated Mr. Meyers’ Constitutional Right To Self-Representation, When It
Ignored His Request To Proceed Pro Se

A.

Introduction
Mr. Meyers asserts the district court violated his right to self-representation, as

guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, when it ignored his
request to proceed pro se. See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975); State v. Hoppe, 139
Idaho 871, 874-75 (2003); Fritz v. Spalding, 682 F.2d 782, 784 (9th Cir. 1982). The violation of
Mr. Meyers’ right to self-representation requires that his conviction be vacated.

B.

The District Court Violated Mr. Meyers’ Constitutional Right To Self-Representation
Mr. Meyers asserts the district court violated his constitutional right to self-

representation, when it ignored his request to proceed pro se. Mr. Meyers timely asserted his
right to self-representation. (See R., pp.82-83; Tr., p.70, L.25 – p.71, L.8.) He definitively stated
at the end of the letter to the district court, “I choose to exercise the right to defend myself in this
matter.” (R., p.83.) Mr. Meyers, much like the defendant in Faretta, in the weeks before his
trial “clearly and unequivocally declared to the trial judge that he wanted to represent himself
and did not want counsel.” See Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835. But the district court did not address
Mr. Meyers’ choice to exercise his right to self-representation. (See generally R., pp.82-91;
Tr., p.73, L.1 – p.74, L.8.)
Here, the State argues Mr. Meyers’ “attempted assertion of his right of self-representation
was not framed as a clear and unequivocal request that the court take any particular action.
Therefore, it was not an effective assertion of the right.” (Resp. Br., p.8.) The State contends
“the letter reads not as a request that the district court discharge appointed counsel and allow
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[Mr.] Meyers to proceed pro se, but instead as notice to the court that [Mr.] Meyers himself had
already set the wheels in motion for this outcome.” (Resp. Br., p.9.)
However, Mr. Meyers’ letter actually contains his clear and unequivocal request to
proceed pro se. In the letter, Mr. Meyers requested the district court “hold my one day bench
trial between December 25th [of 2016] and January 1st [of 2017],” as opposed to the January 25,
2017 date set by the district court. (See R., p.82.) Mr. Meyers wrote that he had “fired [counsel]
and notified his supervisor,” and that he was “prepared to represent myself in this matter and will
present my defense as soon as is possible.” (R., p.82.) He concluded the letter by stating, “I
choose to exercise the right to defend myself in this matter.” (R., p.83.) Thus, Mr. Meyers
specifically requested the district court reset his court trial for an earlier date, where he would
conduct his own defense. Mr. Meyers submitted a clear and unequivocal request to proceed
pro se. See Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835-36.
The State further argues that the appearance of the different attorney from the public
defender’s office, who represented Mr. Meyers at the court trial and in post-trial proceedings,
“seemingly addressed the primary basis for [Mr.] Meyers’ stated desire to represent himself—his
dissatisfaction with [counsel]. Therefore, without further clarification from [Mr.] Meyers about
what exactly he wanted the district court to do, it would have been reasonable for the court to
have considered the matter settled and to have moved forward with the proceeding.” (Resp.
Br., p.9.) However, as discussed above, Mr. Meyers submitted a clear and unequivocal request
to proceed pro se. Even with the appearance of the different attorney at the start of the court
trial, the district court should have addressed Mr. Meyers’ request to proceed pro se, to give him
the requisite last clear chance to assert his constitutional right. See Fritz, 682 F.2d at 784.
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The State also argues, “to the extent [Mr.] Meyers’ statement constituted a request,
[Mr.] Meyers subsequently abandoned the request by failing to re-assert it and by proceeding to
trial with a different attorney.” (Resp. Br., p.8.) But the totality of the circumstances suggests
Mr. Meyers did not abandon his request to proceed pro se.
The State notes that Mr. Meyers “did not attempt to re-assert the right prior to the court
trial,” and, at the court trial, “did not inform the court that there were any pending matters that
needed to be addressed.” (Resp. Br., p.9.) However, as examined in the Appellant’s Brief (App.
Br., p.9), there does not appear to have been a hearing, where Mr. Meyers would have had the
opportunity to remind the district court of his request to proceed pro se, between the date the
district court scheduled the court trial and the date of the court trial. (See R., pp.81-85.) While
Mr. Meyers did not bring up his assertion of his right to self-representation at the beginning of
the court trial, the district court also did not inquire into his letter at that time. (See Tr., p.73, L.1
– p.74, L.8.)
Further, contrary to the State’s suggestion, Mr. Meyers’ competency evaluations and
commitment for mental health treatment did not excuse the district court’s failure to address his
request to proceed pro se. The State contends that Mr. Meyers’ “mental health issues made it
paramount that any request to represent himself be clearly stated and followed up on.”
(Resp. Br., p.9.) After discussing Mr. Meyers’ competency proceedings, the State, based on
Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164, 167-78 (2008), argues that “a defendant’s mental health
issues, even if not so severe as to render him incompetent to stand trial, may justifiably preclude
the defendant from representing himself.” (See Resp. Br., pp.9-10.)
In Edwards, the United States Supreme Court held “that the Constitution permits judges
to take realistic account of the particular defendant’s mental capacities by asking whether a
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defendant who seeks to conduct his own defense at trial is mentally competent to do so.”
Edwards, 554 U.S. at 177-78.

However, the trial court in Edwards had addressed the

defendant’s requests to proceed pro se and found the defendant was not competent to defend
himself. See id. at 168-69. Conversely, the district court in the instant case never responded to
Mr. Meyers’ request to proceed pro se, much less determine he was not competent to represent
himself. Thus, this case is distinguishable from Edwards. Mr. Meyers’ competency evaluations
and commitment for mental health treatment did not excuse the district court’s failure to address
his request to proceed pro se.
The district court, when it ignored Mr. Meyers’ request to proceed pro se, violated his
constitutional right to self-representation. Thus, the judgment against Mr. Meyers should be
vacated, and the case should be remanded for further proceedings. See Faretta, 422 U.S. at 836.

CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, as well as the reasons contained in the Appellant’s Brief,
Mr. Meyers respectfully requests that this Court vacate his judgment of conviction, and remand
the case for further proceedings.
DATED this 20th day of March, 2018.

__________/s/_______________
BEN P. MCGREEVY
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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